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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN HOLDING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. Case No, 870156-CA 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Due to its dissatisfaction with the statement of issues 
presented on appeal in the Brief of Appellant, the respondent 
Intermountain Holding Company ("Intermountain") restates the 
issues presented on appeal: 
1. Under Utah Rule Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), does the 
trial court have the authority to set aside a judgment 
entered over five years prior to the time the motion seeking 
to set the judgment aside is filed? 
2. Even if the motion was filed in a timely manner, is 
it a clear abuse of the trial court's considerable discretion 
to deny the motion when the party against whom the judgment 
is entered fails to have a hearing on the motion for in 
excess of five years? 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Judgment by Default was entered in this case on August 
12, 1980.1 On January 10, 1986, appellant Advance Business 
Equipment ("ABE") filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment.2 ABE 
also filed a second Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Hearing 
Thereon dated May 25, 1986,3 together with the Affidavit of 
Attorney John T. Caine.4 
Intermountain filed the Affidavit of Randall S. Feil 
dated August 29, 1986,5 setting forth facts relating to the 
entry of the Judgment by Default. After several hearings 
were scheduled, at a hearing held on December 19, 1986, the 
District Court denied the Motions to Set Aside. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 3, 1975, Intermountain and ABE entered into 
a three-year Lease Agreement for one-half of a 6,000-square 
foot building located at approximately 2281 South West Temple 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.6 The Lease Agreement expired 
1
 R. 23-24. 
2
 R. 36-37. 
3
 R. 38-39. 
4
 Affidavit of Attorney John T. Caine (R. 40-42) 
("Caine Affidavit"). 
5
 R. 47-54. 
6
 Compliant H 3, 4 & Exhibit A (R. 2-3 & 6-9). 
2 
on January 31, 1978.7 After the expiration of the Lease 
Agreement, ABE continued to occupy the premises on a month-
to-month basis.8 On October 13, 1978, Intermountain served 
a Fifteen-Day Notice to Quit upon ABE, terminating ABE's 
month-to-month tenancy.9 
On November 2, 1978, Intermountain filed a Complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
against ABE.10 This Complaint was served upon ABE on January 
18, 1979.11 
Before ABE filed an answer, however, the parties entered 
into a Stipulation for Settlement dated February 10, 1979.12 
Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation for Settlement required ABE to 
pay Intermountain the sum of $2,899.42 on or before February 
17, 1979.13 Paragraph 2 of the Stipulation for Settlement 
required ABE to remove itself from the rented premises on or 
before February 28, 1979.14 Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation 
7
 Id. at 1 4 (R. 3). 
8
 Id. at H 5 & 6 (R. 3). 
9
 Id. at 1 11 & Exhibit B (R. 3-4 & 10). 
1 0
 R. 2-12. 
1 1
 Summons (R. 13-14). 
1 2
 R. 15-16. 
1 3
 Id. 
1 4
 R. 16, 
for Settlement provided that, if ABE failed to make the 
required payment to Intermountain by February 17, 1979, or if 
ABE failed to vacate the premises on or before February 28, 
1979, Intermountain could proceed on its Complaint.15 
ABE failed to pay the remaining amounts due and failed 
to remove itself from the rented premises on or before 
February 28, 1979, breaching the Stipulation for 
Settlement.16 ABE actually failed to remove itself from the 
rented premises until May 15, 1979.17 One month later, on 
June 14, 1979, counsel for Intermountain contacted counsel 
for ABE, Mr. John T. Caine, and informed him of the breaches 
of the Stipulation for Settlement and of Intermountain's 
intention to enter a default against ABE. Despite this 
notice, Intermountain received no response from ABE or Mr. 
Caine.18 
Consequently, on August 12, 1980, approximately fourteen 
months after notifying ABE of its intention to take a default 
1 5
 Id. 
16
 Affidavit of Stephen G. Stoker dated July 10, 1980 f 
4 (R. 20) ("Stoker Affidavit"); Affidavit of Randall S. Feil 
dated August 29, 1986 J 7 (R. 48) ("Feil Affidavit"). 
17
 Affidavit of Raymond Bowers dated July 16, 1980 % 3 
(R. 18) ("Bowers Affidavit"). 
18
 Stoker Affidavit 1 6 (R. 21); Feil Affidavit % 8 (R. 
48) ; Contra, Affidavit of Attorney John T. Caine f 5 (R. 41) 
("Caine Affidavit"). 
4 
judgment against it, a Default Certificate was entered 
against ABE.19 Also, on August 12, 1980, a Judgment by 
Default was entered in favor of Intermountain and against 
ABE,20 giving ABE credit in the sum of $1,800.0021 for the 
four rent checks in the amount of $450.00 each in the 
possession of Intermountain's counsel at the time the 
Stipulation for Settlement was executed.22 On the same day, 
August 12, 1980, a copy of the Judgment by Default was mailed 
to ABE's counsel of record, Mr. Caine.23 
ABE filed its first Notice of Hearing stating that ABE 
"will call on for hearing its Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 
on the 28th day of August, 1980, . . . " 2 4 The Court, 
however, struck the Motion because counsel did not appear.25 
ABE filed a second Notice of Hearing stating that ABE "will 
call on for hearing its Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the 
1 9
 R. 17. 
2 0
 R. 23. 
2 1
 Bowers Affidavit f 5 (R. 19). 
2 2
 Stipulation for Settlement f 1(a) (R. 15). 
2 3
 R. 24; Mr. Caine in the Affidavit of Attorney John 
T. Caine f 4 (R. 41) acknowledges receipt of the Judgment by 
Default. 
2 4
 R. 22. 
2 5
 Minute Order dated August 28, 1986 (R. 26). 
5 
19th day of September, 1980."26 This second Notice of 
Hearing, however, was not filed until October 17, 1980, 
approximately one month after the date the hearing was 
scheduled to take place.27 ABE, however, asserts that these 
hearings were struck because ABE believed the matter had been 
resolved and the Judgment by Default would be removed because 
it was entered in error.2** After these hearings were 
scheduled, rescheduled, and struck, however, negotiations 
between ABE and Intermountain continued until they reached an 
impasse. 
ABE also never filed the Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
referred to in the Notices of Hearing and never filed any 
affidavits in support of any such motion. No Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment or any affidavit in support of a Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment dated before 1985 or filed before 1986 is 
contained in the record on appeal.29 
2 6
 Notice of Hearing (R. 27). 
2 7
 Id. 
2 8
 Caine Affidavit % 1 (R. 41). 
2 9
 In the record on appeal the Judgment by Default was 
filed August 12, 1980 (R. 23), the Certificate of Mailing of 
the Judgment by Default to counsel for ABE was attached to 
the Judgment by Default (R. 24) , the Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements was filed on August 12, 1980 (R. 25), a Minute 
Order was filed on August 28, 1980 (R. 26), and the second 
Notice of Hearing was filed on October 17, 1980 (R. 27); the 
next document in the record on appeal is an Execution dated 
March 8, 1985 (R. 28). 
6 
Intermountain agreed to modify the Judgment by Default 
if Mr. Burke, the principal of ABE, signed a Promissory Note 
in his personal capacity.30 Mr. Burke, however, was not 
willing to sign such a note. Mr. Burke's refusal to sign the 
note was set forth in a letter dated December 5, 1980, from 
Mr. Caine, counsel for ABE, to Mr. Randall S. Feil, counsel 
for Intermountain.31 The full text of the December 5, 1980, 
letter follows:32 
After our last telephone conversation, I spent some 
time with my client, Mr. Burk [sic], to attempt to 
get him to sign the Promissory Note. I am sorry to 
report that because of the uncertainty of his 
divorce, he is just simply not willing at this time 
to commit himself to pay $200.00 per month because 
he is not certain he can actually afford that. He 
is already under a temporary court order to pay 
$450.00 a month for three children and is in 
contempt of court because he is delinquent. 
In the divorce, his wife was also asking for 
alimony payments of $200.00 a month plus additional 
payments on debts. If the judge does not afford 
him some relief, there is no way he could pay these 
amounts plus the $200.00 a month you want. He is 
basically taking in $800.00 to $1,000.00 a month 
income to himself. 
The company is on the verge of bankruptcy. There 
are no real assets that are free and clear. The 
building the office is in is rented and his 
inventory is only large enough to fill on-going 
accounts. The company also has approximately 
$35,000.00 in judgements against it, prior to 
Feil Affidavit f 10 (R. 49). 
Id. at f 11 & Exhibit C (R. 49 & 54). 
Id. Exhibit C (R. 54). 
30 
31 
32 
7 
yourself. We have been attempting to work with 
each creditor, as with you, to get the debts 
squared away so that the business could continue to 
operate. If he could operate for a year without 
further law suits or problems, he would probable 
[sic] be able to pull the company out of its 
financial problems. 
I realize this doesn't help your client, but I know 
of no other way to proceed. As far as I am 
concerned, we could do one of two things; your 
client could either wait a little longer to see how 
we come out on the divorce, or we will just have to 
go back into court and argue my Motion to Set Aside 
the Judgement. 
If you have any other suggestions, I would be open 
to them. I appreciate your cooperation. 
Consequently, the Judgment by Default was never modified 
because Mr. Burke, ABE's principal, refused to execute a 
promissory note.33 
Sometime before March 8, 1985, Intermountain located 
some property owned by ABE and attempted to execute upon the 
Judgment by Default. The Clerk of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County issued an Execution dated 
March 8, 1985,34 and counsel for Intermountain filed a 
Precipe35 directing the Sheriff to execute upon property 
owned by ABE and located at 4611 Namba Way, Murray, Utah. 
Following the directions contained in the Precipe, the Salt 
3 3
 Id. at % 11 (R. 49) . 
3 4
 R. 28-29. 
3 5
 R. 30-31. 
8 
Lake County Sheriff noticed the sale of the Namba Way 
property for April 9, 1985, at 12:00 p.m. (noon).36 This 
Sheriff's Sale, however, was cancelled due to ABE's filing of 
bankruptcy.37 
It was not until January 10, 1986, that ABE filed its 
first Motion to Set Aside Judgment.38 While the Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment is dated December 31, 1985, it was not 
filed until January 10, 1986, as indicated by the clerk's 
stamp.39 No hearing, however, was ever scheduled on this 
Motion. On July 25, 1986, ABE filed a second Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and Hearing Thereon dated May 25, 1986 
scheduling a hearing for August 1, 1986.40 Although this 
second Motion to Set Judgment and Hearing Thereon is dated 
May 25, 1986, it was not filed with the Salt Lake County 
Clerk's Office until two months later.41 Also, in 
conjunction with this second Motion to Set Aside, ABE filed 
the Affidavit of Attorney John T. Caine dated May 15, 1986, 
3 6
 Proof of Publication (R. 34). 
3 7
 Real Estate-Execution Cancelled (R. 35). 
3 8
 R. 36-37. 
3
^ Id. 
4 0
 R. 38-39. 
4 1
 Id; this document scheduled a hearing on August 1, 
1986, at 10:00 a.m. 
9 
and filed on July 25, 1986.42 
The second Motion to Set Aside originally scheduled for 
hearing on August 1, 1986, before the Honorable Scott 
Daniels, was continued until August 15, 1986, at 10:00 a.m.43 
The August 15, 1986, hearing was rescheduled to August 29, 
1986.44 In opposition to ABE's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 
Intermountain filed the Affidavit of Randall S. Feil, one of 
the attorneys who was representing Intermountain at the time 
the Judgment by Default was entered.45 Counsel for ABE 
failed to attend the hearing scheduled on August 29, 1986, 
and the District Court ordered that the Motion to Set Aside 
be denied.46 At ABE's counsel's request an additional 
hearing was held on December 19, 1986. The Court entertained 
the oral argument of counsel and once again denied the 
Motions to Set Aside. 
R. 40-42. 
Order dated August 1, 1986. 
Amended Notice of Hearing dated August 14, 1986 (R. 
R. 47-54. 
Minute Order dated August 29, 1986 (R. 46). 
42 
43 
44 
44-45). 
45 
46 
10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
No Motion to Set Aside was filed in this case until 
January 10, 1986, over five years after the Judgment by 
Default had been entered. Consequently, under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b)(1), the trial court had no choice other than to deny 
the Motion. 
Further, even if the Motion to Set Aside Judgment had 
been filed in a timely manner, the District Court did not 
clearly abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
Judgment by Default, entered in excess of six years prior to 
the date of the hearing on ABE's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO 
SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 12, 
1980, WHEN THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT IS FILED ON JANUARY 10, 1986, 
OVER FIVE YEARS LATER. 
A motion for relief filed under the first four 
subsections of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be 
filed within three months from the date the Judgment is 
entered. Neither Motion to Set Aside specifies the 
subsection in Rule 60(b) under which it is being filed, 
although ABE argues on appeal that it was filed under 
11 
subsection (l), 4 7 and under subsection (7). 4 8 The basis for 
the requested relief — inadvertence and excusable neglect— 
fall within Rule 60(b)(1). ABE even argues that subsection 
as grounds for its requested relief on this appeal,49 
Consequently, because ABE's grounds for relief are 
encompassed in subsection (1) of Rule 60(b), ABE cannot 
escape the three-month limitation by resorting the "catch-
all" subsection (7) of Rule 60(b).50 
In this case, the Judgment by Default was entered on 
August 12, 1980, and the Certificate of Mailing on the 
Judgment by Default indicates that it was mailed to counsel 
for ABE on the same date. Consequently, within three months 
from the entry of the judgment, ABE was under an obligation 
to file a motion for relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
ABE did file two Motions to Set Aside Judgment, the 
first dated December 31, 1985, and filed on January 10, 
1986,51 and the second dated May 25, 1986, and filed on July 
4 7
 Brief of Appellant at 5. 
4 8
 Id. at 8. 
4 9
 Id. at 5. 
5 0
 In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah 
1986); In re Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985); 
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). 
5 1
 R. 36-37. 
12 
25, 1986.52 The first Motion, therefore, was filed over five 
years after the Judgment was entered. The second Motion was 
filed almost six years after the Judgment was entered. 
Neither of these Motions, therefore, were filed in a timely 
manner.53 
ABE also asserts that two Motions to Set Aside were 
filed.54 ABE, however, suggests that the first Motion was 
filed before 1986 or in a timely manner, but was stricken 
from the calendar due to discussions that the judgment would 
be set aside because it was in error.55 ABE did file two 
Notices of Hearing on a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, the 
first setting a hearing for August 28, 1980,56 which was 
stricken due to counsel's non-appearance.57 The second 
Notice of Hearing was filed on October 17, 1980, 
approximately one month after the hearing it scheduled for 
September 19, 1980.58 The record on appeal, however, does 
5 2
 R. 38-39. 
5 3
 E.g. , In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345, 1349 
(Utah 1986). 
5 4
 Brief of Appellant at 3-4. 
5 5
 Id. at 3. 
5 6
 R. 22. 
5 7
 Minute Order dated August 28, 1980 (R. 26). 
5 8
 R. 27. 
13 
not contain any Motion to Set Aside filed in a timely manner• 
ABE is correct in its assertion that two separate 
motions were filed, but the record demonstrates that neither 
motion was filed in a timely manner. Accordingly, pursuant 
to the terms of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and its mandate that 
any motion to set aside must be filed within three months 
after the entry of the judgment, the District Court properly 
denied ABE's untimely Motions to Set Aside. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE RECORD REFLECTED THAT A 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE HAD BEEN FILED IN A 
TIMELY MANNER, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT ENTERED 
IN AUGUST OF 1980 WHEN THAT REQUEST WAS 
ARGUED TO THE COURT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 
DECEMBER OF 1986 
The District Court in this case has considerable 
discretion in determining whether to grant relief under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 60(b). That discretionary decision will not be 
reversed on appeal unless the appellant clearly demonstrates 
an abuse of that considerable discretion, which places a very 
heavy burden upon the appellant.^9 That some basis may exist 
to set aside the Judgment by Default does not require the 
conclusion that the District Court abused its discretion in 
5 9
 Katz v. Pierce. 723 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986); 
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); Pitman v. 
Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1984). 
14 
refusing to do so when the facts and circumstances support 
the refusal.60 
While the record reflects, as ABE asserts, that two 
Motions to Set Aside were filed, both of these Motions were 
filed in 1986, over five years after the judgment had been 
entered. Even if a timely Motion had been filed, the 
District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion in 
refusing to set aside the Judgment by Default entered on 
August 12, 1980, when the oral argument was scheduled over 
six years later on December 19, 1986. Failing to notice up 
the Motion for an extended period of time, such as over six 
years, caused evidence to become stale. It is an appropriate 
exercise of the District Court's broad discretion in this 
matter to deny such a motion. 
Based upon the record in this case, even if a Motion had 
been filed in a timely manner and if that Motion had been 
argued in a timely manner, neither of which occurred in this 
case, the District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion 
in refusing to set aside the Judgment by Default. Normally, 
however, it is inappropriate to examine the merits of a 
default judgment on appeal.61 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1984). 
15 
A» ABE Did Not Comply With the Terms of the Stipulation for 
Settlement 
The Lease Agreement under which Intermountain leased the 
property to ABE expired according to its own terms on January 
31, 1978.62 ABE, however, continued to possess the property 
after the expiration of the Lease Agreement as a month-to-
month tenant. ABE was served with a Fifteen-Day Notice to 
Quit on October 13, 1978.63 ABE, however, continued to 
occupy the premises until May 15, 1979.64 On November 3, 
1978, ABE was served with a Summons and Complaint.65 A 
Stipulation for Settlement was entered into between the 
parties requiring ABE to pay $2,899.42 on or before February 
17, 1979, and requiring ABE to remove itself from the 
premises on or before February 28, 1979.66 ABE, however, 
failed to discharge either of these obligations. 
There was no credible evidence before the District Court 
to support ABE's allegation that it "complied with the terms 
of the Settlement Agreement and that plaintiff 
[Intermountain] had no right to enforce the default 
6 2
 Lease Agreement f 1 (R. 6). 
63
 Fifteen-Day Notice to Quit (R. 10). 
6 4
 Bowers Affidavit f 3 (R. 18). 
6 5
 R. 13-14. 
66
 Stipulation for Settlement ff 1 & 2 (R. 15-16). 
16 
provisions against [ABE] . . . . "b/ ABE was under an 
obligation to pay Intermountain the sum of $2,899.42 on or 
before February 17, 1979. Intermountain's counsel held four 
checks in the amount of $450.00 each for a total of $1,800.00 
to be applied to that sum, leaving a balance of $1,099.42. 
ABE makes the undocumented assertion that it paid all the 
monies that were due pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation 
for Settlement.68 
ABE also suggests (six years after the events occurred) 
that it removed itself from the premises in a timely fashion 
pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation for Settlement.69 
This bare assertion is unsupported by any documentary 
evidence. 
The more credible evidence in the record on appeal, 
however, is to the contrary. Two affidavits filed 
contemporaneously with the taking of the Judgment by Default 
establish that Intermountain had received only the $1,800.00 
already in its counsel's possession and that ABE had failed 
to pay the remaining amounts due and owing under the 
67
 Brief of Appellant at 7. 
68
 Caine Affidavit if 4 (R. 41) . 
69
 Id. Noticeably absent from the record is any 
affidavit by Mr. Burke, ABE's principal. 
17 
Stipulation for Settlement.70 Further, the record reflects 
that ABE failed to remove itself from the premises until May 
15, 1979, approximately two and one-half months after the 
time the Stipulation for Settlement required ABE to remove 
itself from the premises.71 Further, ABE's counsel was 
notified of the breach of the Stipulation for Settlement, 
requested to file an Answer, and when no response was filed, 
the Judgment by Default was taken in favor of Intermountain 
and against ABE.72 Consequently, there was ample evidence, 
which is more credible than ABE's evidence because it was 
more contemporary with the occurrence of the events, from 
which the District Court could conclude that ABE had no 
defense to the taking of the Default Judgment. Further, the 
District Court could properly conclude that, due to the 
extensive delay and the staleness of the evidence, 
Intermountain had been improperly prejudiced by ABE's delay. 
/u
 Bowers Affidavit 1 5 (R. 19); Stoker Affidavit J 4 
(R. 20); Mr. Bowers was one of the partners in Intermountain 
and filed this Affidavit almost contemporaneously with the 
time the events were occurring; Mr. Stoker was 
Intermountain's counsel of record at the time and also filed 
his Affidavit almost contemporaneously with the occurrence of 
the events; Mr. Caine's Affidavit, on the other hand, was 
filed over six years after the events occurred. 
7 1
 Bowers Affidavit f 3 (R. 18) ; Stoker Affidavit f 4 
(R. 20). 
7 2
 Stoker Affidavit 1 6 (R. 21) . 
18 
B. ABE Was Aware That the Judgment by Default Had Been 
Entered 
On June 14, 1979, Intermountain's counsel notified ABE's 
counsel of Intermountain's intention to take a Default 
Judgment against ABE, While it is true that a Default 
Judgment was not entered until over a year later on August 
12, 1980, a copy of the Judgment by Default was mailed to 
ABE's counsel. Further, six days later, ABE's counsel 
prepared a Notice of Hearing dated August 18, 1980, and filed 
it with the Court on August 20, 1980, scheduling a hearing on 
a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, which was never filed, on 
August 28, 1980.73 Consequently, ABE was aware of the fact 
that a Judgment by Default had been entered against it, but 
failed to file a motion or appear at the hearing scheduled on 
August 28, 1980.74 
C. ABE Knew That Intermountain Refused to Modify or Set 
Aside the Judgment by Default 
ABE suggests that, after discussing the matter with 
Intermountain's counsel, the Motion to Set Aside was stricken 
from the calendar because an agreement had been reached that 
the judgment would be removed because it was in error.75 
Negotiations continued between the parties in which 
7 3
 Notice of Hearing (R. 22). 
7 4
 Minute Order dated August 28, 1980 (R. 26). 
7 5
 Caine Affidavit % 7 (R. 43). 
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Intermountain agreed to modify the entered Judgment by 
Default in the event that ABE's principal, Mr, Burke, would 
execute a promissory note personally obligating Mr. Burke for 
ABE's debt to Intermountain. As reflected in ABE's counsel's 
letter dated December 5, 1980,76 Mr. Burke refused to 
personally obligate himself for the debt. As of that date, 
therefore, ABE was aware that Intermountain did not intend to 
set aside the Judgment by Default unless Mr. Burke would 
agree to personally obligate himself on a promissory note. 
ABE also was aware that Mr. Burke had refused to meet 
Intermountain's demand in that regard, and therefore, 
Intermountain had no intention of modifying or setting aside 
the Judgment by Default. Consistent with this understanding, 
ABE's counsel suggested in its December 5, 1980, letter, that 
they had a choice: either wait to determine the outcome of 
Mr. Burke's divorce proceedings or go back into court and 
argue a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Apparently, ABE chose 
to wait, rather than present a Motion to the Court and argue 
it. In fact, ABE waited for a period exceeding six-years to 
file and argue that motion.77 
7 6
 Affidavit of Randall S. Feil, Exhibit C (R. 54). 
7 7
 The assertion in Caine Affidavit f 7 (R. 40-42) is 
that Mr. Caine believed that after speaking with 
Intermountain's counsel that the matter had been resolved and 
the Judgment would be removed as it was in error. This 
assertion, however, is directly controverted by the December 
20 
D. ABE Offers No Excuse for the Final Twenty-Month Delay 
Finally, even if ABE was justified in its initial delay 
in this case, by April of 1985, ABE was aware that 
Intennountain was attempting to execute upon its property by 
virtue of the Judgment by Default, ABE filed for bankruptcy 
sometime prior to April 8, 1985, which caused the 
cancellation of the Sheriff's Sale,78 ABE took no action in 
attempting to argue any Motion before the Court until 
December 19, 1986, over one and one-half years later. 
Consequently, even if ABE had a justifiable excuse for the 
initial four and one-half year delay, it was responsible for 
an additional delay of over twenty months. Based upon this 
second delay, for which ABE has no excuse, together with the 
attendant prejudice to Intennountain, the Court would be 
justified in exercising its discretion in favor of denying 
ABE's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
5, 1980, letter (R. 54), which Mr. Caine drafted and signed. 
This letter "recognized at that time Intermountain had no 
intention of modifying its Judgment by Default unless Mr. 
Burke became personally obligated on the debt, something Mr. 
Burke refused to do. Consequently, the statement in the 
Brief of Appellant at 6 that Intermountain recognized that 
the Judgment by Default was improper and would take no action 
to enforce it was refuted. The more credible evidence is 
that ABE's counsel knew that, due to Mr. Burke's refusal to 
become personally obligated in the debt, Intermountain had no 
intention of modifying the Judgment by Default. 
7 8
 R. 35. 
21 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the District Court's refusal to 
set aside the Judgment by Default entered in favor of 
Intermountain and against ABE. First, Utah Rule Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(1) requires a Motion to Set Aside a Judgment 
to be filed within three months after the Judgment is 
entered. Despite the fact that ABE was aware that a Judgment 
by Default had been entered on August 12, 1980, it failed to 
file any Motion to Set Aside the Judgment until January 10, 
1986, over five years later. 
Second, even if the motion had been filed in a timely 
manner, no oral argument was held in this case until after 
the lapse of six years following the entry of the Judgment by 
Default. This created problems concerning the staleness of 
evidence and Intermountain's ability to properly defend 
itself against the motion. On that basis alone — the 
failure to notice up the motion for hearing for such an 
extended period of time — the District Court was justified 
in exercising its considerable discretion in favor of denying 
ABE's request for relief. 
Third, even if a Motion had been filed in a timely 
manner and if it had been argued in a timely manner, the 
District Court was justified in exercising its ample 
discretion in refusing to grant ABE's request for relief. 
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The most credible evidence in the record indicates that ABE 
had no defense to the entry of this judgment against it. It 
breached the Stipulation for Settlement by failing to pay the 
amounts due and by failing to vacate itself from the premises 
before the agreed upon date. Intermountain notified opposing 
counsel of its intent to take a default judgment. Based upon 
opposing counsel's failure to respond, the Judgment was 
entered due to ABE's multiple breaches of the Stipulation for 
Settlement. 
Finally, ABE was aware of the entry of the Judgment by 
Default and entered into negotiations with Intermountain to 
resolve it. These negotiations, disintegrated because ABE's 
principal, Richard C. Burke, refused to execute a promissory 
note. Knowing that the judgment was entered and that it 
could not be resolved through negotiations, however, ABE 
failed to take the necessary steps to have it set aside, if 
it had any basis to do so. Accordingly, even if ABE filed a 
timely Motion and if it argued it in a timely manner, the 
Court was justified in exercising its discretion in refusing 
to set the judgment aside. 
The Order of the District Court should be affirmed, with 
costs awarded to Intermountain. Further, pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, because this appeal is 
frivolous, attorneys' fees and double costs should be awarded 
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to Intermountain in the form of a judgment against ABE and 
its attorney. 
Dated: November hQ , 1987. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
lark CAT. I(arsj 
Attorneys^ -ftSr 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
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